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FAST
MOVE

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TOUCH DOWN

INDEX

I. GENERAL:

- A. MISSION OBJECTIVES
- B. STAGING
 - (1) PREPARATION
 - (2) PRE-DEPLOYMENT
 - (3) MOVEMENT
 - (4) STAGING AREA
- C. CONCLUSIONS
- D. RECOMMENDATIONS
- E. COMMENTS

II. TIME TABLE - SCHEDULE VS. ACTUAL:

III. INDIVIDUAL SECTION COMMENTS:

- A. ADMINISTRATION
- B. OPERATIONS
 - (1) PERSONNEL EQUIPMENT
- C. MATERIEL
 - (1) MAINTENANCE
 - (2) SPECIAL EQUIPMENT
- D. COMMUNICATIONS
- E. SECURITY
- F. MEDICAL/PE

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|------|---|--------|
| T/S | # | 160452 |
| Copy | 2 | of 4 |
| | 1 | of 23 |

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I. GENERAL

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| | | |
|------|---|--------|
| T/S | # | 160452 |
| Copy | 2 | of 4 |
| Page | 2 | of 23 |

TOUCH-DOWN 7-8 JULY 1959

I. GENERAL:

A. TOUCHDOWN MISSION OBJECTIVES: To obtain the specified flight-line and target coverage outlined in Headquarters Operations Order 2-59. The timetable for this operation envisioned the utilization of the "Fast Move" concept. To implement Touchdown three sites were required: Home base, a pre-strike base and a post-strike base.

B. STAGING:

1. Preparation: The permanent "Fast Move" kit was used for this operation. Specifics concerning items transported are outlined in Det 10-10 Operations Plan 42-59. This kit had been modified, mobility-wise, as a result of the [] exercise.

2. Pre-Deployment: The two C-130s arrived 5 and 6 July. A C-124 arrived and departed 5 July [] with 3000 gallons of fuel and emergency pickup kit consisting of wing cart frames, fuselage cart, tail dolly, lifting bags and necessary tools. The loading of C-130 aircraft was delayed until the afternoon of 7 July. This was done for two reasons:

a. To avoid premature attraction by activity.

b. Avoided unnecessary loading in case of early cancellation. Loading went as planned. Two aircraft were loaded in three hours.

3. Movement: The C-124 departed 6 July and was directed to have the fuel in place at [] the morning of 8 July. This was accomplished and the C-124 returned to [] with emergency pickup gear. The aircraft remained there thru 9 July, then proceeded to Adana and dropped off the emergency pickup kit. The delay in delivering the fuel to [] until 8 July was recommended to avoid a premature indication of activity. The pre-strike aircraft did not received the "Go" message until one hour after the revised scheduled time [], however, due to the aggressiveness of the C-130 crew the arrival time at [] was made good. The post-strike C-130 departed on the revised schedule and made good the scheduled arrival time. (See Tab II)

4. Staging Area:

a. Pre-Strike - Very little liaison with the [] was required. The acting base commander offered us the hangar we had surveyed a year ago. This was accepted with the view in mind of having to conceal the U-2 for 24 hours in case of delay. After approximately 3 hours of ground time, Communications were established and the maintenance, Personal equipment and special equipment sections were ready to operate. Personnel spread their blankets and sleeping bags on the hangar floor or outside in an open area and awaited the mission aircraft's arrival.

T/S 160452
2 4
23

Messing (food) consisted of IF-7 rations and water we had taken along in 5 gallon cans. All managed well under these conditions. No quarters or messing support was requested or received from the base. Weather was hot. The mission aircraft (flown by Mr. Powers) arrived exactly on time. The spare configuration was dropped and the primary configuration carried on the C-130 was installed. Fuel was pumped by air pressure as utilized on [redacted] The only aircraft writeup on arrival was a red instrument light out on the airspeed meter. Three hours after landing, the aircraft was ready to launch. Fifteen minutes were required to tow aircraft into position on the runway. Aircraft was started and tookoff with minimum ground time after all checklists were complete. (No taxi). Six hours after mission takeoff time, communications were terminated and 30 minutes later the Pre-Strike team was airborne. Aircraft arrived home at 09/0800Z.

b. Post-Strike - The post-strike section arrived at [redacted] on time and, approximately three hours after, communications were established. The C-130 A/C was parked on an abandoned macadam strip about three hundred yards off the main runway at the far end of the field from the operations building. Shortly after arrival personal contact was made by the USAF Air Attache from [redacted] who introduced the airport manager. The latter spoke excellent [redacted] and was completely co-operative throughout the stay. Subsequently Attache departed for [redacted]. During the first day the site was visited by [redacted] and later by [redacted] [redacted] who expressed a desire to be shown through the C-130. This was accorded and there were no further contacts with indigenous personnel. Personnel bivouacked for the night either on the ground near the A/C or in the open hold. The high, dry, hot climate was quite favorable to the operation. Water supply carried with the mission was adequate. Food source was C-rations and IF-7's. There were no casualties due to injury or illness. After it was learned that the mission would be launched, fuel was off-loaded and positioned for refueling the U-2. The variable, gusty winds caused some concern; however, these were steady and down the runway at landing time. After a rapid letdown due to low fuel reserve, the mission A/C arrived on time, landed uneventfully, and was towed to the service site. There were no maintenance write-ups; however, the right rear tire was changed because of apparent damage. Approximately two hours were required to refuel and service the A/C. During this time the ferry pilot was pre-breathed and dressed in the hold of the C-130, and the mission pilot was cared for and debriefed. After service was complete the ferry pilot was placed in the A/C, the A/C was towed to the active runway, cockpit check performed and the ferry flight launched on time. Following this all gear, except communications and the MA-2, was stowed and on-loaded. After being informed of the arrival of the U-2 at home base, communications were struck, remainder of gear on-loaded, and post-strike section departed for home base.

C. CONCLUSIONS: The time table as set up for the "Fast Move" operation is very realistic. It provides the maximum element of surprise (or security) to an operation.

1/5 160452
2 4
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The C-130 aircraft is the only aircraft for this type operation. This based on capability to top (altitude) weather in most cases and high terrain in all cases. In addition its speed affords maximum time at home station prior to making "Go-No Go" decision. The C-124 is not suited for this type operation.

Communications with the present G. W. package is effective and reliable.

Personnel can exist and endure for short periods with the facilities for sleeping and messing as provided by the kit.

The chances of success and the advantages enjoyed due to the "Fast Move" are greatly reduced if delays are encountered. A deterioration of target weather to a point should be accepted to keep the momentum in force.

D. RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. Support aircraft flight plan time to be sent to Headquarters six hours prior to scheduled takeoff time. This will permit adjustment to takeoff time to make good the desired arrival time. This is all important since everything hinges on pre-strike and post-strike teams getting set up on time.

2. Messages through relay station be carefully monitored to avoid large backlog of traffic when staging stations make initial contact. messages should have top precedence.

E. COMMENTS: Individual section comments are noted in the enclosed separate tabs. The only casualty of the operation was the loss of one portable comode. After frequent use the post-strike commander condemned it to remain at the site.

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II - TIMETABLE

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|------|---|--------|
| T/S | # | 160452 |
| Copy | 2 | of 4 |
| Page | 6 | of 23 |

TOUCHDOWN TIMING

| <u>SCHEDULED</u> | <u>ACTUAL</u> | <u>SCHEDULED TOTAL TIME</u> | <u>EVENT/ACTION</u> |
|------------------|---------------|---------------------------------|----------------------------|
| 07/2000 | 07/2000 | H-28:00 | C-130 Departs Adana (Pre) |
| 08/0330 | 08/0415* | -20:30 | C-130 Departs Adana (Post) |
| 0800 | 0800 | -16:00 | C-130 Arrives Pre |
| 0930 | 0935 | -14:30 | C-130 Arrives Post |
| 1430 | 1410 | -09:30 | U-2 Departs Adana |
| 2000 | 1945 | -04:00 | U-2 Arrives Pre |
| 09/0001 | 09/0001 | H-Hour | U-2 Departs Mission |
| 0600 | 0630** | +6:00 | C-130 Departs Pre |
| 1000 | 0907 | +10:00 | U-2 Arrives Post |
| 1200 | 1130 | +12:00 | U-2 Departs Post |
| 1600 | 1510 | +16:00 | U-2 Arrives Adana |
| 1800 | 1840 | +18:00 | C-130 Arrives Adana (Pre) |
| 1800 | 1815 | +18:00 | C-130 Departs Post |
| 10/0000 | 10/0000 | +24:00 | C-130 Arrives Adana (Post) |

52:00 Total elapsed time Adana to Adana

* Takeoff adjusted to make good scheduled arrival of 0930

** C-130 departed 30 minutes late due to requirement to maintain communications 6 hours after U-2 departed.

NOTE: All times GMT.

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III - INDIVIDUAL SECTION COMMENTS



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|------|---|--------|
| T/S | # | 160452 |
| Copy | 2 | of 4 |
| Page | 8 | of 23 |

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B. OPERATIONS

1. PREPARATION:

a. Because this move was anticipated checklists of equipment had already been prepared and only a short time was needed to pack two briefcases with all equipment for operations and flight planning. All the necessary items were available and sufficient to plan the primary mission and an additional one as well.

b. The canned mission was completed prior to departure. This was a tremendous help and should be accomplished whenever possible. For last minute changes and briefing and celestial work a table or flat surface was improvised. The JN series charts did not show enough cultural features, particularly cities and industrial complexes. This is probably due to the shortage of information of the area.

2. PRE-STRIKE SITE OPERATION:

a. On 7 July after a slight delay awaiting authorization, the pre-strike party departed [] at 2000Z in C-130 57-456A. The first stop was [] for fuel. Arrival time was 0040Z on 8 July. In spite of a short delay caused by a malfunction in the single-point refueling system at [], the ground time was one hour and forty minutes. Departure from [] was 0220Z and arrival at [] was []

b. The commo site and hangar setup went on simultaneously and by 1045Z commo was ready to operate. The remainder of the afternoon was given to positioning fuel and catching up loose ends.

c. The weather and airfield facilities were checked and results were sent back to [] for the ferry mission. The weather forecast was excellent for the arrival time of the ferry mission. The approach and landing chart had only one change: the beacon frequency had been changed to []

e. At 1945Z [] 367, ferry mission 4125F, arrived ahead of schedule. No difficulties with the aircraft. The local officer in the tower effectively suppressed any notice of the arrival with no difficulty and no questions.

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|------|----|--------|
| T/S | # | 160452 |
| Copy | 2 | of 4 |
| Page | 10 | of 23 |

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f. Pre-flight planning and briefing went off normally with no difficulty. Lighting was very poor and the heat was oppressive.

g. Mission 4125 departed on schedule at 0001Z, 9 July and the hangar gear was packed up immediately thereafter.

h. After the scheduled six-hour wait, authorization to depart was received and the commo site was packed up. From the time the departure authority was received to takeoff time was approximately thirty minutes. All hands pitched in and packed and loaded the commo gear on the C-130.

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j. The elapsed time from [redacted] to the pre-strike site and back was 46:40. 20:35 of this was flying time.

3. CONCLUSIONS:

a. The fast-move concept is feasible, practical and decidedly advantageous from the standpoint of security.

b. The local personnel were very helpful and cooperative especially in regard to and undue notice of the aircraft.

c. The C-130 is the most practical aircraft available for this move.

d. The time schedule is adequate to cover all but very un-usual delay factors.

4. RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. Add a table or chart board to the deployment gear.

b. Try to procure more adequate charts.

c. Include in the kit adequate lighting for target study.

d. Utilize canned missions if at all possible.

e. Obtain latest facility charts and a list of radio facilities in denied territory.

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| | |
|------|----------|
| T/S | 160452 |
| Copy | 2 of 4 |
| Page | 11 of 23 |

B-1. PERSONAL EQUIPMENT

1. Facilities and equipment for setting up the P.E. section were generally adequate with some exceptions.

2. The P.E. box was opened and unloaded in the hangar next to the room designated for prebreathing. Cots, two oxygen cylinders, seat pack tester and necessary equipment were moved into the room and set in place. Pilots used the cots for sleeping after all equipment was checked and pre-flighted.

3. Both drivers pre-breathed at the same time with [] acting as standby until [] take-off was accomplished. The pre-breathing room was very hot and humid even during the pre-dawn hours. A ceiling fan did little to alleviate the drivers' discomfort. As a result, neither pilot had the proper amount of rest or sleep prior to take-off time. No latrine was available closer than several hundred yards in an adjacent hangar.

4. Dressing and transporting the pilot to the aircraft presented no problems. A jeep was used with sufficient walk-around-bottles (four carried and two used) carried along until pilot hookup was made. Care must be exercised when challenged by guards along taxiways. Leaving the hangar 30 minutes prior to take-off is adequate for hookup and cockpit preflight.

5. Flying insects were no problem during pre-breathing since it was done at night. If sleeping and pre-breathing are to be done in daylight hours, however, mosquito netting will be required because of flies. Crawling insects, especially large crickets, are very numerous at night requiring liberal use of aerosol bombs to keep them out of the pre-breathing room.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. A portable latrine be set up near the pre-breathing room inside the hangar.

2. Two sheets be used on each cot to absorb perspiration.

3. Sterno stoves be available for providing hot coffee or tea for the drivers use prior to pre-breathing.

4. A portable air conditioner be used for cooling the pre-breathing room.

5. From the medical standpoint, considerably more drinking water should be available. Also, enough sterno or alcohol stoves for providing coffee etc. for all personnel involved in the operation. A portable medical kit packed by the Detachment Flight Surgeon and carried as part of P.E. is adequate for minor injuries.

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C. MATERIEL

1. The cargo for this exercise was deployed aboard C-130 aircraft. Cargo aboard the first C-130 had a total weight of 20,931 pounds, and 2095.8 cube. Cargo weight aboard the second C-130 was 23,776 pounds, and 1818.8 cube. No mechanical assistance (i.e.) fork-lift) was used in loading the C-130 aircraft at the Home Base that would not be available at the Deployment Sites.

2. Only one item was used from Nr. 1 FAK (tail-wheel). No items were used from FAK Nr. 2. No changes in the kit contents are contemplated. Both kits have been checked and prepared for future deployment. All FAK bins and large items have been placed on casters for ease of handling.

3. The equipment deployed was adequate and no noticeable shortages affecting the mission were observed.

4. The Materiel Section has established a "Staging Log" for all such exercises. This is to insure proper packing, crating, marking, accomplishment of Shipping Documents and manifesting prior to Deployment. Log will also serve as a permanent record of items taken with weight and cube for each section.

~~TOP SECRET~~

| | | |
|------|----|--------|
| T/S | # | 160452 |
| Copy | 2 | of 4 |
| Page | 13 | of 23 |

C-1. MAINTENANCE

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1. "Pre-Strike" Kit was found to be much more mobile than when used on "Operation [redacted] This was mainly due to the use of flyaway bins in place of wooden boxes. All of the equipment stood up well and proved to be adequate. The hardest part of the operation, the fueling of the U-2, was accomplished in 40 minutes. The aircraft was ready to go again two hours and fifteen minutes after it landed at the "Pre-Strike" Base. The only aircraft discrepancy was two burned out instrument lights.

2. "Post-Strike" operations were much the same as the "Pre-Strike." The aircraft was ready for takeoff two hours after landing. The only maintenance required was to changing of one tail wheel.

3. The operation can be cut down as far as weight and cube goes. Work has begun on a new set of kits for Maintenance which will cut the weight down and cube. This is possible on both the "pre" and "post" kits.

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C-2. SPECIAL EQUIPMENT

A. Transport to pre-strike base.

1. Equipment:

- (a) 1 ea "B" Config unloaded.
- (b) 2 rolls 0-6-6000 "B" material.
- (c) 1 ea power cart.
- (d) 1 ea cart with tools and misc. equipment.
- (e) 1 ea Onan power generator 110V 60 cycle.
- (f) 1 ea Dehumidifier.
- (g) 1 ea Air conditioner - 3/4 ton.
- (h) 1 ea hatch cart.

2. Equipment loaded, transported and unloaded without damage.

B. Base Set-up:

1. Work Area: A room inside of hangar was used as a work area and dark room for loading "B" Config. Room was sufficiently large for operation and storage.

2. Power: Room was equipped with electrical outlets but no power available. Onan generator was set up and utilized for 110V power. Generator had sufficient power to operate power cart, air conditioner and de-humidifier.

3. Air conditioning: Conditioner was insufficient for size of room and of little value. For future operations the pre-fabricated tent will be used, as dark room and config storage.

C. Operation:

1. U-2 was launched from home base with a B Config and a tracker camera in full operating condition. The B config was to be used as a back-up in the event of pre-strike base camera failure.

2. The "B" config at pre-strike base was put into readiness four hours prior to launch time from forward base.

3. On arrival of U-2 at pre-strike base, the preloaded config was removed and replaced with config at base two hours before launch time.

4. Tracker was cycled and clock hacked.

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| T/S | 160452 |
| COPY | 2 4 |
| 15 | 23 |

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5. Pertinent data concerning cameras was placed in an envelope and tapped to B config.

6. On arrival of U-2 back at home base, cameras were removed and checked. Film was packaged and made ready for shipment.

D. Conclusion:

1. Operation was smooth with sufficient time allotted for each operation.

2. Packaging of equipment will be revised to be more compact and mobile.

3. Foresee no problems for future operations of this type.

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| T/S | 160452 |
| 2 | 4 |
| | 23 |

Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt

on the promise that the party would return in 24 hours and had been no where else where a visa could have been obtained. It is felt that this situation might vary with the different personalities who meet the incoming aircraft and could have caused trouble in this instance if it had been handled less diplomatically by the Staging Commander.

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| T/S | 160452 |
| 2 | 4 |
| 20 | 23 |

II. GENERAL COMMENTS POST-STRIKE:

1. The Security Officer and one Security Agent briefed the support aircraft crew and departed with the post-strike party on 8 July 1959, at 0615 Local via C-130.

25X1C 2. Arrival was made at the post-strike base at 1400 local.

25X1C 3. Upon arrival, contact was made with the Air Attaches from [] and liaison was established with the airport manager []

25X1C [] The C-130 was parked in a remote section of the field, about 1½ miles from the airport tower and terminal. Customs officials came to the site but did not inspect passports or cargo. They request and were given a copy of the passenger manifest and this appeared to be all that was required for customs purposes. After about two hours the Air Attaches departed for their home station.

4. The Communications tent and other equipment was erected but the remainder of the aircraft was not unloaded in order to display as little of the cargo as possible. Perimeter security was provided and there were no visitors. An encampment of Bedouin tribesmen (5 tents) were located about ½ mile away but heat haze, dust, etc., obscured their view and they caused no difficulty.

5. During the night, perimeter security was provided for the C-130 without incident.

6. At 1432 hours local on 9 July 1959, the mission aircraft arrived and was immediately towed to the C-130 where pre-flight operations were already in progress.

7. At 1646 hours local 9 July 1959, the mission aircraft departed without incident. During the time the primary aircraft was on the ground the support aircraft crew was segregated forward of the C-130 in a location where they could not observe what was taking place. The interior of the C-130 was used for pre-breathing, flight planning, etc., and the crew was restricted from from this area during this period.

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9. Soon after the message "to secure" was received the Communications tent was struck, equipment loaded and the C-130 was airborne, arriving at home base at 0205 local 10 July 1959.

III. CONCLUSIONS: (PRE - POST STRIKES)

Security was adequate in all respects. A total of two security personnel were included in the post-strike party and this is the minimum number needed. One should be either the Security Officer or the Deputy Security Officer. The other should be either a Special Agent or a mature responsible special employee. The "fast move" concept is ideal from a security viewpoint. Personnel (both project and support aircraft crews) are briefed as late as possible prior to departure. Written briefings are supplemented by an oral briefing. No dress clothing, cameras, etc., are allowed to be taken. Personnel are instructed to have no contact with local nationals and to refer all questions, inquiries, etc., to the commander or security officer. Personnel are also restricted to the vicinity of the support aircraft. All equipment is pre-positioned in the [] hangar. The support aircraft are quickly loaded and secured after their arrival. Support aircraft crews are not briefed until the last minute. When possible, support aircraft file a local flight clearance. Personnel not going on staging are told only that a staging is in process and are not given any locations, times or other details. By use of the "Fast Move" technique and keeping staging personnel and equipment to a minimum, most base personnel are never aware that the detachment has had a group on TDY. Staging personnel are "out and in" so fast that they are seldom missed. Also, most people at the staging locations are not aware that "visitors" have arrived or departed. Incidents with local nationals have been reduced to zero. Staging personnel are so busy that they have neither the time nor the inclination to mix with local nationals. These factors combined with reducing the time spent on staging to a minimum combines to give better security.

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS:

It is recommended that some provision to heat rations and make hot coffee and tea be made for future stagings.

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F, MEDICAL/PE REPORT

1. Due to remote, isolated nature of the post-strike base, the Detachment F/S was detailed to accompany the mission to function as Medical Officer and PE technician.

2. From the medical aspect, no significant problems were encountered. Food supply consisted of C-rations and 1F-7 box lunches, which are entirely satisfactory for the short period involved. Water supply was that carried with the mission and was ample in quantity. No injuries or illnesses occurred. The mission pilot appeared extremely fatigued when received at the post-strike base. This was due to very unfavorable environmental factors at the pre-strike base. The high relative humidity and temperature apparently made adequate rest impossible and in addition made the pre-breathing procedure very uncomfortable and tiring.

3. From the PE aspect as well there were no significant problems. Pre-breathing facilities for the ferry pilot were arranged in the hold of the C-130. The area was reasonably comfortable in all respects. Due to the extremely low relative humidity and constant winds, efficient body cooling in the shade was possible; sleeping and pre-breathing were therefore accomplished without untoward effects. It was originally intended to perform pre-breathing in the closed hold, the latter being cooled by the airconditioner refrigeration system. However, the C-130's auxiliary power unit malfunctioned and this approach was abandoned, although an appropriate situation may develop for its future employment.

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| | | |
|------|----|--------|
| T/S | # | 160452 |
| Copy | 2 | of 4 |
| Page | 23 | of 23 |